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Abstract The use of anonymous testimony in England and Wales has
recently been the subject of a number of high-profile appellate decisions
and legislative intervention. As the law currently stands, it is permissible
for the criminal courts to receive such testimony, subject to certain safe-
guards. This article evaluates the position against the threshold for an-
onymous evidence laid down by the European Court of Human Rights. It
is argued that such evidence is too readily admissible under the current
legislative framework. As such, the rules regulating the use of anonymous
testimony should be amended so that they comply fully with the fair trial
rights of the accused.
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Recent years have witnessed considerably greater attention being paid
to the problems posed by witness intimidation.1 Many jurisdictions have
rolled out witness protection programmes and introduced a range of
measures to protect witnesses when giving evidence in court.2 Some,
including England and Wales, make provision for fearful witnesses to
give their testimony in hearsay form, thus avoiding the need to come to
court altogether.3 Occasionally, particularly in cases involving young
people and sexual offences, identities of victims and witnesses may be
withheld from the public record and restrictions may be placed on media
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1 Until recently, there was little empirical evidence as to how widespread witness
intimidation may be. However, in 2006, the Home Office noted that the number
of cases for perverting the course of justice (which includes witness intimidation)
rose by over 30 per cent between 2000 and 2005 (Home Office, Working with
Intimidated Witnesses (2006)). Drawing on the findings of the 1998 British Crime
Survey, Tarling et al. concluded that intimidation occurs in just under 10 per cent
of reported crime and 20 per cent of unreported crime: R. Tarling, L. Dowds and
T. Budd, Victim and Witness Intimidation: Findings from the British Crime Survey (Home
Office: London, 2001). Angle et al.’s 2002 survey found that a quarter of all
witnesses felt intimidated by an individual, which was actually higher than the 21
per cent who reported feeling intimidated by the process of giving evidence: H.
Angle, S. Malam and C. Carey, Witness Satisfaction: Findings from the Witness
Satisfaction Survey 2002 (Home Office: London, 2003).
2 In England and Wales, a range of special measures, including the use of screens
and televised testimony are available in certain circumstances under Pt II of the
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.
3 See Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 116(2)(e) and the recent Court of Appeal
decision in R v Horncastle [2009] EWCA Crim 964.
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reporting.4 Whilst many of these measures are contentious in their own
right, none has caused quite a stir as the receipt of anonymous evidence
where the identity of an opposing witness is withheld from the
defence.
In the view of some observers, the granting of anonymity to prosecu-
tion witnesses is nothing short of an affront to the principle of open
justice. The right of the accused to ‘confront’ opposing witnesses is said
to incorporate dignitarian, symbolic and instrumental purposes, includ-
ing assisting in the ascertainment of truth, ensuring greater openness,
and offering the defendant a more effective and fairer means of chal-
lenging the prosecution’s case.5 The dangers of anonymous evidence are
said to include secrecy,6 the inability of the accused to challenge oppos-
ing witnesses,7 a decline in public confidence,8 a shift toward ‘anti-
democratic’ values;9 and the risk of a ‘slippery slope’ toward further
curtailment of fair trial rights.10 Such disquiet is unsurprising; the prin-
ciple of orality, which lies at the heart of the common law trial, requires
that evidence is given live in court by the witness in person. However, by
the same token, it should be borne in mind that, with the recent rise in
serious organised and gang-related crime, many witnesses will be re-
luctant to testify unless they are provided with a reassurance that their
identity will be concealed from the accused. There is a clear policy
incentive for protecting the identities of informers in such cases;11 and
anonymity is one possible means of achieving that. Moreover, a failure
to offer a sufficient level of protection to witnesses at risk of intimidation
could, in certain cases, constitute a breach of their rights under Articles
2, 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as a
plethora of international soft-law standards.12
The juxtaposition between these two sets of objectives has recently
been catapulted to the forefront of political and legal debates in England
and Wales, following the decision of the House of Lords in R v Davis and
Others13 in April 2008. In response, the government rushed through
emergency legislation in the form of the Criminal Evidence (Witness
4 See further A. Gillespie and V. Bettinson, ‘Preventing Secondary Victimisation
through Anonymity’ (2007) 70 MLR 114.
5 See e.g. G. Marcus, ‘Secret Witnesses’ [1990] PL 207; S. Enright, ‘The Anonymous
Witness’ (1996) 146 NLJ 1032; R. Friedman, ‘Face to Face: Rediscovering the
Right to Confront Prosecution Witnesses’ (2004) 8 E & P 1; W. O’Brian, ‘The Right
of Confrontation: US and European Perspectives’ (2005) 121 LQR 481.
6 See e.g. R. Costigan and P. Thomas, ‘Anonymous Witnesses’ (2000) 51 NILQ 326;
S. Burns, ‘Blind Shots at a Hidden Target’ (2008) 158 NLJ 1091; D. Lusty,
‘Anonymous Accusers: An Historical and Comparative Analysis of Secret
Witnesses in Criminal Trials’ (2002) 24 Sydney Law Review 361; Justice, Secret
Evidence (Justice: London, 2009).
7 See e.g. O’Brian, above n. 5; Lusty, above n. 6; Burns, above n. 6.
8 Costigan and Thomas, above n. 6.
9 Ibid.
10 See M. Swift QC, ‘Witness anonymity: a slippery slope’, The Times, 27 June 2008.
See also Lusty, above n. 6.
11 See comments of Edmund-Davies LJ in D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171 at 176.
12 See J. Doak, Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice: Reconceiving the Role of
Third Parties (Hart: Oxford, 2008) ch. 2.
13 [2008] 1 AC 1128.
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Anonymity) Act 2008, and subsequently proposed a longer-term solu-
tion under the auspices of the Coroners and Justice Bill 2009. This article
considers these developments against the backdrop of the European
Convention on Human Rights alongside the pressing public policy ob-
jective of encouraging intimidated witnesses to testify. We contend that
the law as it stands still falls short of the Strasbourg requirement—
namely that reliance on the testimony of anonymous witnesses should
be ‘strictly necessary’ and should not be the ‘sole or decisive’ basis for a
conviction. If intimidated witnesses are to be encouraged to testify, it is
necessary to consider other legal and policy options that will carry less
drastic an impact upon the fairness of the trial.
Anonymity and the ECHR
The main Convention provision governing the use of anonymous testi-
mony is Article 6(3)(d), which guarantees the accused the right ‘to
examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him’. Although the provision is some-
times said to enshrine a ‘right to confrontation’,14 the wording of the
Convention itself gives us little guidance as to whether physical con-
frontation is an essential element of Article 6(3)(d). Certainly, the
Article does not purport to mirror the so-called ‘confrontation principle’
enshrined in the Sixth Amendment of the US Constitution,15 and there
is considerable ambiguity in its scope compared with its American
counterpart. This can, perhaps, be attributable to its comparative juven-
escence, as well as the fact that it embodies a standard that must be
capable of applying across jurisdictions with quite different legal cultures
without causing undue disquiet. For this reason, the European Court of
Human Rights has often shied away from being over-prescriptive con-
cerning specific modalities of criminal procedure and evidence.
Breaches of the right to a fair trial are unlikely to be found on the basis
of evidential or procedural rules, with the court expressing a clear
preference in favour of examining the trial process as a whole in order to
ascertain whether the fundamental requirements of fairness have been
observed.16
The European Court of Human Rights is first and foremost concerned
with monitoring the 47 Member States of the Council of Europe to
ensure they act in accordance with the Convention. The transcultural
14 S. Maffei, The European Right to Confrontation in Criminal Proceedings (Europa:
Groningen, 2006) 61; J. Swergold, ‘Taking “Blind Shots at a Hidden Target”:
Witness Anonymity in the United Kingdom’ (2009) 30(2) Boston College
International and Comparative Law Review 471 at 478.
15 The scope of the latter is broad, and it embodies a number of different demands:
that testimony should be given under oath, subjected to cross-examination, given
in the presence of the accused and in the presence of the trier of fact. For a
comparative analysis, see O’Brian, above n. 5.
16 See Barbera, Messegue and Jabardo v Spain (1988) 11 EHRR 360 at [68]; Doorson v
Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330 at [67], Van Mechelen v Netherlands (1997) 25
EHRR 647 at [50]; PS v Germany (2001) 36 EHRR 1139 at [19]; Lucà v Italy (2003)
36 EHRR 46 at [38].
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nature of this role, coupled with the fact that the court does not actually
have the power to quash convictions, means that the court is unlikely to
become embroiled in laying down specific guidelines on aspects of
criminal procedure and evidence. It is thus unsurprising that the court
has been reluctant to define the precise parameters of Article 6(3)(d), a
position that has been exacerbated by a lack of clarity as what to what
actually constitutes ‘anonymous’ testimony.17 The term may cover un-
identified witnesses who have provided information to the police in-
cognito, or alternatively may include witnesses whose identity is known
to the Crown and the court, but whose identity will have been withheld
from both the defendant and his counsel. In addition, the witness’s
identity may be known by all parties involved, but withheld from the
general public through the imposition of reporting restrictions. As we
shall see, the Strasbourg Court has occasionally failed to delineate which
sets of principles ought to apply to which types of ‘anonymous’ witness.
Notwithstanding, it remains true that the task of ascertaining core
principles from the court’s jurisprudence is far from straightforward. It
is, perhaps, little wonder that both the appellants and respondents in
Davis felt that the weight of the Convention case law fell in their
favour.
The Strasbourg Court has reiterated on a number of occasions that
evidence should be given in the presence of the accused at a public
hearing with a view to adversarial argument.18 However, there are
exceptions to this principle, and the ambiguity has arisen from the
precise circumstances as to when such departures should be regarded as
compatible with the rights of the defence. In much of its earlier case law,
the court seemed to place an overriding emphasis on the need for
witnesses to at least attend court and be available to have their evidence
challenged by the accused.19 In Windisch v Austria,20 the court appeared
to doubt the validity of anonymous evidence at all:
[T]he Court notes that the Convention does not preclude reliance, at the
investigation stage, on sources such as anonymous informants. However,
the subsequent use of their statements by the trial court to found a
conviction is another matter. The right to a fair administration of justice
holds so prominent a place in a democratic society that it cannot be
sacrificed.21
However, in more recent times the court has apparently softened its
stance, perhaps anxious to be seen to be responsive to the growing
problem of witness intimidation. In an oft-cited passage in Doorson v
Netherlands,22 the court stated that:
17 See D. Ormerod, ‘Evidence: Witnesses Anonymity’ [2007] Crim LR 70.
18 See e.g. Kostovski v Netherlands (1989) 12 EHRR 434; Unterpinger v Austria (1986)
13 EHRR 175; Riepan v Austria (App. No. 35115/97, 14 November 2000); AM v
Italy (App No. 37019/97, 14 December 2001).
19 See e.g. Unterpinger v Austria (1986) 13 EHRR 175; Delta v France (1990) 16 EHRR
574; Kostovski v Netherlands (1989) 12 EHRR 434; Ludi v Switzerland (1992) 15
EHRR 173; Saidi v France (1993) 17 EHRR 251.
20 Windisch v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 281.
21 Ibid. at [30].
22 Doorson v Netherlands (1996) 23 EHRR 330.
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It is true that Article 6 does not explicitly require the interests of witnesses
in general, and those of victims called upon to testify in particular, to be
taken into consideration. However, their life, liberty or security of person
may be at stake, as may interests coming generally within the ambit of
Article 8 of the Convention . . . Contracting States should organise their
criminal proceedings in such a way that those interests are not unjustifiably
imperilled. Against this background, principles of fair trial also require that
in appropriate cases the interests of the defence are balanced against those
of witnesses or victims called upon to testify.23
It was thus held that the court should undertake an interest-balancing
exercise since the accused’s right to a fair trial may come into conflict
with the rights of victims and witnesses. Positive obligations concerning
the right to life, the right to be free from inhuman and degrading
treatment, and the right to privacy will frequently come into play in
cases where witnesses are considered to be at risk from reprisals. This
case underlines an apparent departure from the court’s traditional ap-
proach to focusing solely on the rights of the accused towards taking into
account newly emergent rights of victims, witnesses and the broader
community.24 Thus in Van Mechelen v Netherlands,25 it was held that ‘the
use of statements made by anonymous witnesses is not under all cir-
cumstances incompatible with the Convention’.26 However, the task of
discerning any set of overriding principles as to when anonymous
testimony should be admitted is somewhat difficult. It might be said that
there are three fundamental safeguards to have emerged from the case
law to date: anonymous testimony should only be received if it is ‘strictly
necessary’; anonymous testimony should not form the ‘sole or decisive’
basis for any conviction; and, where it is used, sufficient counterbalan-
cing measures must be in place for the defence.
(a) Anonymous testimony should only be received if it is ‘strictly
necessary’
It is clear that anonymity should only ever be used as a special measure
of last resort.27 In Van Mechelen, 11 undercover police officers gave
evidence anonymously in the judge’s chambers. Testimony was relayed
to the accused and his counsel via a sound link, and the judge himself
conducted the cross-examination. In the view of the court, the ‘extreme
limitations on the right of the accused to have the evidence against them
given in their presence’ could not be justified.28 It was held that police
officers, as part of their public duty, should be prepared to give evidence
before defendants in court. Although domestic courts should be pre-
pared to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the threat posed to
witnesses, here adequate reasons had not been given as to why such
‘extreme limitations’ on the rights of the accused were necessary. In an
oft-cited passage, the court held that ‘any measures restricting the rights
23 Above n. 22 at [70].
24 See further Doak, above n. 12.
25 Van Mechelen v Netherlands (1998) 25 EHRR 657.
26 Ibid. at [52].
27 See R v Mayers [2008] EWCA Crim 1418 at [8].
28 Van Mechelen v Netherlands (1998) 25 EHRR 657 at [60].
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of the defence should be strictly necessary. If a less restrictive measure
can suffice, then that measure should be applied’.29
Although the European Court of Human Rights has not to date
provided a definitive answer as to what anonymity orders should be
strictly necessary for, it is clear that they should be confined to the most
serious of cases. In all cases where the court has held anonymity to be
justifiable under Article 6, witnesses had been subjected to, or had
reasonable grounds to fear that they would be subject to, some form of
intimidation or reprisal. Where a genuine threat to life or physical
integrity has been made, Article 2 or 3 will be triggered. In such
circumstances, state bodies (including the courts) are under a positive
obligation to take preventative operational measures to protect an indi-
vidual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.30
Thus where protection of identity is deemed necessary to protect the
witness, then domestic courts are under an obligation to do so.31 It is
clear that it is not a requirement that actual threats towards the witness
have been made, yet by the same token the witness’s subjective fear of
reprisal is insufficient in itself to justify anonymity. In more recent cases,
the court has placed a particular emphasis upon the veracity of the
witness’s fear and whether it was based on reasonable grounds. In Visser
v Netherlands,32 for example, the court found that the domestic court had
improperly issued an anonymity order on the grounds that the applic-
ant’s co-accused had a history of violence; there was no evidence that
the individual in question intended to harm the applicant.
In certain cases involving child victim-witnesses, the concept of ne-
cessity extends beyond physical integrity. Restrictions can be placed
upon the rights of the defence to safeguard the privacy interests of the
child. In SN v Sweden,33 the court highlighted that special considerations
needed to be taken into account in cases involving sexual offences
against children:
The Court has had regard to the special features of criminal proceedings
concerning sexual offences. Such proceedings are often conceived of as an
ordeal by the victim, in particular when the latter is unwillingly confronted
with the defendant. These features are even more prominent in a case
involving a minor. In the assessment of the question whether or not in such
proceedings an accused received a fair trial, account must be taken of the
right to respect for the private life of the perceived victim. Therefore, the
Court accepts that in criminal proceedings concerning sexual abuse certain
measures may be taken for the purpose of protecting the victim, provided
29 Above n. 28 at [59].
30 In relation to Art. 2, see Osman v United Kingdom [1999] EHRLR 228. A similar
positive obligation exists in relation to Art. 3: A v United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR
611.
31 See the recent joined cases before the House of Lords: Van Colle v Chief Constable of
Hertfordshire; Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex [2009] 1 AC 225. Although the House
of Lords acknowledged the duty of the police to protect fearful witnesses, the
specific facts of these cases meant that there had been no breach of Art. 2 under
the test laid down by the Strasbourg Court in Osman v United Kingdom [1999]
EHRLR 228 at [115]–[116].
32 App. No. 26668/95, 14 February 2002.
33 (2004) 39 EHRR 13.
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that such measures can be reconciled with an adequate and effective
exercise of the rights of the defence.34
In the instant case, although defence counsel was not present when the
child was interviewed by police officers, the court was of the view
that the defence had been afforded adequate opportunity to challenge
the victim's credibility in the course of the trial. Indeed, counsel for the
accused had voluntarily opted to forego his right to attend one of
the pre-recorded interviews with the child complainant, where he
would have had the opportunity to put questions through an intermedi-
ary. The domestic court had thus taken appropriate steps to balance the
rights of the complainant alongside the fair trial rights of the defence,
with the result that no violation of Article 6. By contrast, the case of PS
v Germany35 concerned the admissibility of out-of-court statements
made by an alleged child victim of a sexual offence. While the court
heard corroborating evidence from the child’s mother and a police
officer, the defence did not have the opportunity to question the child.
On the facts of the case, the court did not feel that the refusal to hear the
witness was necessary in the circumstances of the case and thus Article
6 had been violated.
It should be underlined, however, that PS and SN did not involve
anonymous witnesses; the identities of the accusers were all known to
the defence. The court was satisfied that there was no requirement
under Article 6 for the complainants to be questioned directly by the
defence in court. As argued below, care should be taken to distinguish
these cases from many of the other leading authorities including Door-
son, Kostovski and Van Mechelen, where the identities of the accusers were
withheld from the defence in circumstances where their credibility was
in issue. In these types of cases, we can assume that the ‘necessity’
principle should be applied in full measure.
(b) Anonymous testimony should not form the ‘sole or decisive’ basis
for any conviction
The idea that convictions should not be based on anonymous evidence
alone was first advanced by the European Court of Human Rights in its
first major decision on anonymity, Kostovski v Netherlands.36 The convic-
tions of two men for armed robbery had been based on statements given
to the police by two anonymous witnesses. Both witnesses feared that
they would be subject to reprisal attacks if their identity were made
known. Although they had been interrogated at length by the police,
and one had also been questioned by the examining magistrate, the
defence were unable to question them. The court subsequently held that
Article 6 had been breached.
The facts of Doorson were similar, but the court found sufficient
grounds to distinguish it from Kostovski and found no violation. Doorson
34 Above n. 33 at [47]. See also Baegen v Netherlands (App. No. 16696/90, 26 October
1995); Finkensieper v Netherlands (App No. 19525/92, 17 May 1995).
35 PS v Germany (2003) 36 EHRR 61.
36 Kostovski v Netherlands (1989) 12 EHRR 434.
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concerned drug trafficking, and there was information on police files
which suggested that, if the witnesses’ identities were made known to
the applicant, there was a real risk of the threats being carried out
(rather than merely made). The witnesses in Doorson were granted
anonymity like those in Kostovski, but defence counsel was permitted to
attend the magistrates’ hearing and put questions to them through the
magistrates. Two witnesses gave anonymous evidence before the in-
vestigating judge. The accused was not present, and his counsel was not
permitted to question the witnesses extensively. The accused contended
that this practice constituted a breach of Articles 6(1) and 6(3)(d),
insofar as he had not been present when this evidence was given, nor
had he had the opportunity properly to question the witnesses. The
Commission expressed the opinion that there had been no violation of
the Convention (by 15 votes to 12), and this opinion was followed by
the European Court of Human Rights (by 7 votes to 2). The court
appeared to place a particular emphasis on the fact that the conviction in
this case was not based ‘solely or to a decisive extent’ on the anonymous
evidence.37
In Visser v Netherlands,38 a witness had been granted anonymity when
he agreed to give evidence against the defendant, who had a reputation
for violence in the community. The defendant was convicted, and
complained that he had not been afforded a fair trial since neither he nor
his counsel had been given the opportunity to see the anonymous
witness, and had thus been unable to observe his demeanour under
cross-examination. However, more than five years had passed since the
witness first gave a statement to the police, while the applicant’s co-
accused, whom the witness was purported to fear, had been released
from prison in 1988. The court found that there was no cause for anyone
to believe that they might be targeted by him, and went on to hold that,
since the conviction was based primarily on the evidence of the an-
onymous witness, the principles set out in Doorson had been contra-
vened in this specific case. Similar reasoning was applied in the more
recent case of Krasniki v Czech Republic.39 Even though the defence
lawyer had been present during the taking of the pre-trial statements,
and had the chance to put questions to the witnesses, the court found a
violation since the conviction had nonetheless been based at least to a
decisive extent on the anonymous evidence.
In spite of the similarity of language used in the case law, it is worth
underlining that the terms are not synonymous and the court has not
always been consistent in delineating the distinction between them.40 In
the past, the court has stated that a conviction should not be based on
37 Above n. 36 at [76].
38 Visser v Netherlands (App. No. 26668/95, 14 February 2002).
39 Krasniki v Czech Republic (App. No. 51277/99, 28 February 2006).
40 See also O’Brian, above n. 5 at 494; J. Coster van Voorhout, ‘Intelligence as Legal
Evidence: Comparative Criminal Research into the Viability of the Proposed Dutch
Scheme of Shielded Intelligence Witnesses in England and Wales, and Legislative
Compliance with Article 6(3)(d) ECHR’ (2006) 2(2) Utrecht Law Review 119 at 142.
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anonymous testimony ‘solely’,41 ‘to a decisive extent’,42 ‘in any respect
decisive’,43 ‘solely or decisively’,44 ‘solely or significantly’45, ‘mainly’,46
or even where the evidence simply ‘played a part’.47 Moreover, the task
of identifying the specific basis for a conviction is not always a straight-
forward task, and further confusion arises from the court being prone to
rely on its reasoning in past cases concerning out-of-court statements of
persons known to the defence in those cases involving anonymous
witnesses whose identities are withheld. The decision in Visser provides
a useful illustration. The evidence there was entirely anonymous, yet
the court drew from its reasoning in other cases such as Saïdi v France48
and Asch v Austria,49 which concerned out-of-court statements, rather
than anonymous evidence. While some of the arguments in each type of
case may well be cross-applicable, there is a danger in being too ready to
apply reasoning in quite different types of cases. This is particularly true
in cases involving children or other vulnerable witnesses. In SN v
Sweden, discussed above, the court found no violation in spite of the fact
that the out-of-court statements of the child witness were ‘virtually the
sole evidence’ on which the conviction was based.50 That decision was
clearly dependent on very particular circumstances of the case (i.e. the
seriousness of the offence and the age of the child). Such reasoning
should not be used to support a broader approach for sanctioning the
use of anonymous evidence.
The court took the opportunity to clarify the law in the joined cases of
Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom.51 For the purposes of this
article, it is Tahery’s case that is the more pertinent. Witness ‘T’ was
known to the defendant, but had informed the court that he was too
frightened to give evidence. The prosecution thus sought to rely on an
out-of-court hearsay statement as a central plank of their case, and
Tahery was duly convicted. The court found a violation of Article 6 on
the grounds that there was no realistic way in which the defence would
have been able to rebut his account effectively. In such circumstances,
the starting point for assessing whether a violation had occurred was laid
down in Lucà v Italy:52
If the defendant has been given an adequate and proper opportunity to
challenge the depositions either when made or at a later stage, their
admission in evidence will not in itself contravene Article 6. The corollary
of that, however, is that where a conviction is based solely or to a decisive
41 Windisch v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 281; Saïdi v France (1993) 17 EHRR 251.
42 Kostovski v Netherlands (1989) 12 EHRR 434 at [44]; Delta v France (1990) 16 EHRR
574 at [37]; Asch v Austria (Series A No. 203, 26 April 1991) at [28].
43 Visser v Netherlands (App. No. 26668/95, 14 February 2002) at [46]; Kok v
Netherlands (App. No. 43149/98, 4 July 2000).
44 Doorson v Netherlands (1996) 23 EHRR 330 at [76].
45 Sadak v Turkey (2003) 36 EHRR 26 at [65]. 
46 Isgrò v Italy (App. No. 11339/85, 19 February 1991) at [35]–[37].
47 Lüdi v Switzerland (1993) 15 EHRR 173 at [49].
48 (1991) 15 EHRR 597.
49 (1993) 17 EHRR 251.
50 (2004) 39 EHRR 13 at [52].
51 (2009) 49 EHRR 1.
52 (2001) 36 EHRR 807.
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degree on depositions that have been made by a person whom the accused
has had no opportunity to examine or to have examined, whether during
the investigation or at the trial, the rights of the defence are restricted to an
extent that is incompatible with the guarantees provided by Article 6.53
While a departure from these principles may be possible where wit-
nesses had been identified to the defence and where a state of fear had
been induced by the defendants,54 the position as regards anonymous
witnesses at Strasbourg is now relatively clear. A conviction cannot be
based solely or to a decisive degree on their evidence if the defence have
not had an opportunity to examine them.
(c) Sufficient counterbalancing measures must be in place so as to
ensure a fair trial for the defence
The Strasbourg Court has been always consistent in demanding that
sufficient steps be taken to counterbalance the additional handicaps
suffered by the defence where anonymous witnesses are used. In Van
Mechelen the court noted that, where anonymity is granted, ‘the defence
will be faced with difficulties which criminal proceedings should not
normally involve’.55 Accordingly, Articles 6(1) and 6(3)(d) required
‘that the handicaps under which the defence labours be sufficiently
counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial author-
ities’.56 Similar dicta can be found in the judgments in Kostovski,57
Doorson,58 and Visser.59
The court has been reticent to offer an exhaustive prescription of
what such counterbalancing procedures might involve, but they would
appear to include such matters as the provision of sound links,60 the
opportunity for the trier of fact to see or hear the witness to assess
credibility;61 or putting in place special arrangements for the defence
counsel to question the witness either directly or through the judge/
magistrate62 or even a police officer.63 However, in the case of Kok v
Netherlands,64 the court appeared to suggest that the extent of counter-
balancing measures needed would ultimately hang on the degree to
which the evidence was decisive. In other words, when assessing
53 Above n. 52 at [40]. 
54 Distinguishing the English case of R v Sellick [2005] 1 WLR 3641.
55 Van Mechelen v Netherlands (1998) 25 EHRR 657 at [54].
56 Ibid. at [52]–[53].
57 (1989) 12 EHRR 434 at [43].
58 (1996) 23 EHRR 330 at [72].
59 App. No. 26668/95, 14 February 2002 at [46].
60 Kok v Netherlands (App. No. 43149/98, 4 July 2000).
61 Isgrò v Italy (App. No. 11339/85, 19 February 1991). 
62 See e.g. Delta v France (Series A no. 191-A, 19 December 1990); PS v Germany;
Kok v Netherlands (App. No. 43149/98, 4 July 2000); Birtus v Lithuania (App. Nos
47698/99 and 48115/99, 28 March 2002). However, where the judge undertakes
all of the questioning, the defence are still disadvantaged to an extent insofar as
they are unable to observe the demeanour of the witness: Kostovski v Netherlands
(1989) 12 EHRR 434 at [42]; Van Mechelen v Netherlands (1998) 25 EHRR 657 at
[51].
63 SN v Sweden (2004) 39 EHRR 13.
64 App. No. 43149/98, 4 July 2000.
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whether the procedures followed in the questioning of an anonymous
witness had been sufficient to counterbalance the difficulties caused to
the defence, due weight had to be given to the extent to which the
anonymous testimony had been decisive in convicting the applicant.65
Despite the court’s opinion in Doorson that there would be no com-
pensatory measures that would allow deviation from the sole/decisive
requirement,66 there has been some suggestion that the above-noted
sole/decisive criterion may be dispensed with altogether providing suffi-
cient counterbalancing measures are in place. This appeared to be the
view of the court in Kok.67 That position was, however, rejected in Al-
Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom.68 Citing the relevant paragraph of
Doorson, the court reiterated that:
Even when ‘counterbalancing’ procedures are found to compensate suffi-
ciently the handicaps under which the defence labours, a conviction
should not be based either solely or to a decisive extent on anonymous
statements.69
The decision in Al-Khawaja and Tahery thus brought a welcome measure
of clarity to a series of cases which did not sit particularly easily alongside
each other. While the parameters of Article 6(3)(d) are not yet (and
perhaps never will be) fully delineated, we now have a relatively con-
crete understanding of the appropriate threshold concerning the use of
anonymous witnesses. In summary, while anonymous evidence per se
does not contravene Article 6 of the Convention, it is clear that it should
only be received in the most exceptional of circumstances as a measure
of last resort. Even where a plethora of counterbalancing measures has
been put place, the court has now made it clear that anonymous
evidence still cannot be the sole or decisive basis for a conviction. This
potentially carries significant ramifications for adversarial jurisdictions,
insofar as the court would seem to require that trial judges adopt ‘a
more proactive and dominant role in the proceedings’ in determining
whether cross-examination is required for Article 6 rights to be fully
protected.70
65 The lack of corroborative evidence appeared to be decisive in Kostovski v
Netherlands (1989) 12 EHRR 434 at [44]; Windisch v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 281 at
[31]; and Ludi v Switzerland (1992) 15 EHRR 173 at [47].
66 (1996) 23 EHRR 330 at [69].
67 App. No. 43149/98, 4 July 2000. What is of greater interest about this case is,
however, the court’s statement immediately after reaching these conclusions: ‘In
the Court’s view, in assessing whether the procedures involved in the questioning
of the anonymous witness were sufficient to counterbalance the difficulties caused
to the defence due weight must be given to the above conclusion that the
anonymous testimony was not in any respect decisive for the conviction of the
applicant. The defence was thus handicapped to a much lesser degree.’ (Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 2000-VI, p. 597.)
68 (2009) 49 EHRR 1.
69 Doorson v Netherlands (1996) 23 EHRR 330 at [76].
70 J. Jackson, ‘The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal Evidentiary Processes:
Towards Convergence, Divergence or Realignment’ (2005) 68 MLR 737 at 756.
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Witness anonymity in England and Wales
(a) Background
The adversarial nature of the English common law system was well
established from the days of the Royal Courts in the Middle Ages. The
right of the accused to cross-examine witnesses would appear to have
surfaced in the 16th century.71 Since then, the principle of orality has
required that witnesses testify live, in open court, under oath. Apart
from the notorious era of the Star Chamber, the English courts have
historically shunned anonymous evidence. As Lord Bingham observed
in Davis,72
by a series of small steps, largely unobjectionable on their own facts, the
courts have arrived at a position which is irreconcilable with long-standing
principle.73
These ‘small steps’ were achieved through the courts exercising their
apparent common law powers to facilitate the giving of evidence by
tweaking procedures. The first step of note was the Court of Appeal’s
decision in R v Watford Magistrates’ Court, ex p. Lenman.74 The prosecution
applied for witnesses to give evidence anonymously behind screens
following an incident of violent disorder. The application was granted,
with Beldam LJ stating that it was ‘well established’ that anonymity
could be offered where the interests of justice so required. As Lord
Bingham noted in Davis, this was a curious statement in light of the fact
that the only case supporting the proposition was that of R v DJX, SCY,
GCZ.75 The circumstances there were quite different, with the defence
already knowing the identity of the accusers. Screens were simply used
to shield the child complainants from the sight of the accused; their
identities were already known. Beldam LJ’s reliance on that case as an
authority for his proposition was highly dubious, and appears to mirror
the above-noted tendency of the Strasbourg Court to conflate judicial
reasoning to cover cases both where the identity of the witness is
known, and those where it is not.
In its 1972 report, the Diplock Commission rejected the use of an-
onymous evidence in Northern Ireland as wholly inconsistent with the
idea of a fair trial.76 This was despite a very real risk of reprisals where
witnesses gave evidence in cases involving alleged terrorist-related of-
fences. Such a view contrasted sharply with the report of the Royal
Commission on Criminal Justice, which accepted that courts could allow
witnesses to testify anonymously in exceptional circumstances. How-
ever, shortly afterwards the Court of Appeal upheld another anonymity
ruling in R v Taylor.77 Here, the witness in question was in a position to
71 See Seymour’s Case, 1 How St Tr 483 (1549); Duke of Somerset’s Trial, 1 How St Tr
515 (1551).
72 [2008] 1 AC 1128.
73 Ibid. at [29].
74 [1993] Crim LR 388.
75 (1990) 91 Cr App R 36.
76 See W. J. K. Diplock, Report of the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to Deal with
Terrorist Activities in Northern Ireland, Cmnd 5185 (HMSO: London, 1972) para. 20.
77 [1995] Crim LR 253.
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provide important corroborating evidence of the removal of the victim’s
body from a pub where it was alleged he had been killed. Again, citation
of authority for allowing the anonymous evidence was somewhat thin;
the court again relied on DJX along with a handful of US authorities. It
nonetheless dismissed the appeal, holding that anonymity orders were
within the trial judge’s discretion. The court then set out a list of relevant
factors that should be taken into account before acceding to applications
for anonymity: the question of the potential consequences of revealing
the identity of the witness; the importance of the evidence he or she is
providing; and no undue prejudice is caused to the defendant (although
it was recognised that some degree of prejudice will be inevitable). In
taking all of these factors into account, the court should balance the
need for anonymity—including the consideration of other ways of
providing witness protection in court (e.g. screening the witness or
holding an in camera hearing or screen) against the unfairness or
appearance of unfairness in the particular case. A number of cases
followed,78 yet Taylor retained its status as the leading authority despite
being somewhat ambiguous in terms of the specific circumstances
where anonymity would be justifiable. As part of its wide-ranging
review into the protection for vulnerable and intimidated witnesses, the
Interdepartmental Working Group concluded that the present law was
working ‘satisfactorily’ and saw no need to recommend reform.79
The issue of anonymity had not generally penetrated the headlines,
until 18 June 2008, when it was propelled to the forefront of the
national media in two distinct and opposing contexts. First, the govern-
ment published a report, Engaging Communities in Fighting Crime,80 which
called for the introduction of measures that would allow the elderly, the
disabled and those who were fearful of reprisals to give evidence an-
onymously. On the same day, the House of Lords allowed an appeal of a
convicted double-murderer R v Davis and Others,81 on the grounds that
seven prosecution witnesses had testified anonymously and three of
those witnesses provided the only identification of the defendant as the
gunman.
(b) The decision in Davis
The appellant, Davis, had been convicted by a jury of two counts of
murder. The trial judge had allowed the evidence of the only identifica-
tion witnesses to be given anonymously, having accepted that they,
among others, were in genuine fear that if they gave evidence and their
78 See e.g. R (on the application of DPP) v West London Youth Court [2005] EWHC 2834
(Admin); R v Liverpool City Magistrates’ Court, ex p. DPP (1997) 161 JP 43; R (Al-
Fawwaz) v Governor of Brixton Prison [2002] 1 AC 556; R v Sellick [2005] 1 WLR
3257.
79 Interdepartmental Working Group on the treatment of vulnerable and intimidated
witnesses in the criminal justice system, Speaking Up for Justice (Home Office:
London, 1998) para. 8.32.
80 L. Casey, Engaging Communities in Fighting Crime (Ministry of Justice: London,
2008) 18.
81 [2008] 1 AC 1128.
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identity was revealed their lives would be endangered. The order con-
sisted of withholding the witnesses’ names, addresses and identifying
particulars from the defendant, preventing defence counsel from asking
any question which might enable their identification, giving evidence
under pseudonyms behind screens so that they could be seen by the
judge and jury but not by the defendant, and mechanical distortion of
the witnesses’ natural voices, so although they could be heard by the
judge and jury, recognition by the defendant was prevented (defence
counsel voluntarily regarded himself as bound by those orders too). It
was part of the defence case that the allegations may have been fabric-
ated by a former girlfriend with whom the defendant had fallen out, an
issue which counsel could not fully explore in cross-examination given
his ignorance of who the witnesses were. It was accepted on subsequent
appeal that the testimony of those witnesses was decisive.
The Court of Appeal dismissed Davis’s appeal against conviction but
the House of Lords unanimously agreed it should be allowed, and the
case remitted to the Court of Appeal for consideration of a retrial.82 The
reasoning of their Lordships was, however, far from clear. All agreed that
on the facts that the anonymity orders were an unlawful constraint on
the conduct of the defence and the defendant had not received a fair
trial, but there was inconsistency in their Lordships’ opinions as to the
extent of the common law power to grant anonymity. Moreover, be-
cause the five speeches are largely free-standing, it is impossible to
discern a specific ratio decidendi.
Lord Bingham regarded as paramount the common law principle that
a defendant in a criminal trial should be able to confront his accusers so
that he might cross-examine them and challenge their evidence. He was
critical of previous decisions, including that of the Court of Appeal in the
present case where such a fundamental principle was not awarded
sufficient attention.83 He reviewed the recent authorities where an-
onymity orders had been granted and appeared to restrict each to its
facts without overruling them. For example, anonymity had been per-
mitted where the evidence did not implicate the defendant(s) in the
crime and credibility was not in issue;84 where the evidence was ad-
mitted at committal proceedings rather than at trial;85 where the defend-
ant had seen the witness by way of video camera while she was giving
evidence;86 where anonymous affidavit evidence was admitted in re-
spect of an extradition request;87 and where anonymous written state-
ments had been admitted by a coroner conducting an inquest.88 His
82 The Court of Appeal later ordered a retrial without anonymising the relevant
witnesses, but with other special measures directions to be determined by the
judge (8 July 2008). 
83 [2006] 1 WLR 3130.
84 R v Murphy [1990] NI 306.
85 R v Watford Magistrates’ Court, ex p. Lenman [1993] Crim LR 388 and R v Liverpool
Magistrates’ Court, ex p. DPP (1996) 161 JP 43.
86 R v Taylor and Crabb [1995] Crim LR 253.
87 R (Al-Fawwaz) v Governor of Brixton Prison [2002] 1 AC 556.
88 R v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, ex p. Devine [1992] 1 WLR 262.
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Lordship was of the opinion that the common law did not afford a judge
the power to grant protective measures to protect anonymity any fur-
ther than in these exceptional circumstances.
Lords Rodger, Brown and Mance expressed agreement with Lord
Bingham on this issue, but Lord Carswell, with whom Lord Brown
explicitly disagreed on this point, thought that the common law had
developed more flexibly to permit protective measures. At [59] he
distilled certain propositions including, where it is necessary and justi-
fied, a power to grant anonymity. Lord Carswell was obviously more
uneasy with the decision than their other Lordships and admitted
feeling a great difficulty about the case, but on these facts even he was of
the view that the measures granted went beyond what was permissible
and he was not ‘sufficiently sure’ that the trial was fair.89 The only
flexibility at common law which was accepted by Lord Mance was in
‘exceptional circumstances’ such as those in Murphy.90 It is of note that
Lord Rodger found it unnecessary even to decide the rightness of that
decision. 91
Lord Mance’s speech focused primarily on the Strasbourg judgments.
Although he concluded that ‘the Strasbourg Court does not set its face
absolutely against the admission of anonymous evidence in all circum-
stances’,92 the evidence of the three anonymous witnesses in the present
case was the sole or decisive basis for the defendant’s conviction and
accordingly the trial was unfair.
If we revisit the three fundamental safeguards referred to above and
apply them to the facts of Davis, we are left with the following conclu-
sions. The House of Lords was not asked to and did not rule on whether
witness anonymity was ‘strictly necessary’ but the trial judge and Court
of Appeal had investigated and accepted as genuine the witnesses’
claims of being in fear for their lives had their identity been known.
Crucially however, the evidence did form the sole or decisive basis for
the conviction; and it would have been impossible to put in place
sufficient counterbalancing measures for the defence to ensure a fair
trial.
At no stage of the speeches were the witnesses’ Article 2, 3, or 8 rights
mentioned, which stands the decision in stark contrast to the earlier
decision of Doorson, and the later decision of Mayers considered
below.93
(c) The government response
In the immediate aftermath of the decision, the CPS warned that almost
600 cases could be affected by the ruling, and a £6 million trial at the Old
89 [2008] 1 AC 1128 at [61].
90 [1990] NI 306.
91 [2008] 1 AC 1128 at [44].
92 Ibid. at [82].
93 See further Doak, above n. 12.
The Journal of Criminal Law
522
Bailey was halted.94 The case triggered considerable debate in the pop-
ular press, with cries of how ‘barmy Law Lords’ had ‘unleashed anar-
chy’,95 or how the decision had caused ‘chaos in the legal system’.96 The
Justice Secretary, Jack Straw, moved quickly to inform Parliament that
anonymous evidence was ‘fundamental’ to the successful prosecution of
many serious crimes. The decision, he said, was due to a ‘technical defect
in the law’, which the government intended to remedy.97 The Parlia-
mentary Draftsman's Office was immediately shifted into overdrive; the
decision in Davis was published on 18 June 2008 and by 21 July 2008 it
had been reversed by legislation.98
The Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 abolishes any
common law rules relating to anonymity that would have survived the
decision in Davis, but recognises that unless there are exceptional cir-
cumstances the defendant is entitled to know the identity of witnesses
against him. Under s. 2, a court may make a witness anonymity order in
such terms as it considers appropriate to ensure the identity of a witness
is not disclosed. Section 2(2) provides that the orders which may be used
to ensure a witness’s anonymity include withholding the witness’s name
and other identifying details; the use of a pseudonym; an embargo on
questions that might lead to his identification; the use of screens and
voice modulation. The list is not exhaustive.
The Act addresses the three fundamental safeguards discussed above
in the context of the Strasbourg case law: necessity is addressed twice,
the sole/decisive test is a relevant consideration and an ‘appropriate’
warning should be given to provide an element of counterbalance.
Section 4 provides that three conditions must be satisfied before a
witness anonymity order can be made. In respect of necessity, Condition
A provides that the measures must be necessary to protect the safety of
the witness or another person or to prevent serious damage to property
(s. 4(3)(a)), or prevent real harm to the public interest (s. 4(3)(b)), and
Condition C provides that the order must be necessary in the interests of
justice because it appears to the court that it is important the witness
should testify, and the witness would not testify if the order were not
made (s. 4(5)). Additionally, in respect of s. 4(3)(a), the court should
have regard to any reasonable fear99 of the witness especially whether
the witness or another person would suffer death or injury, or there
would be serious damage to property, if the witness were identified
(s. 4(6)). Condition B addresses the defendant’s fair trial rights and one
relevant consideration that directly impinges on a fair trial (although not
94 See ‘Murder trial halted by ban on anonymity of witnesses’, Evening Standard,
24 June; ‘Court ruling hits police witnesses’, The Independent, 8 July 2008.
95 ‘Anarchy is unleashed’, The Sun, 25 June 2008.
96 Opinion, Daily Mirror, 25 June 2008.
97 Hansard, HC Deb, 26 June 2008, col. 516.
98 For an analysis of the speed of the enactment process, see D. Howarth, ‘The
Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008’ [2008] 8 Archbold News 6.
99 That fear is not synonymous with safety is also examined by Howarth, above n.
98.
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of itself conclusive in respect of this condition)100 is whether the wit-
ness’s evidence may be sole or decisive. Counterbalancing measures are
implicit in the Act, including, for example, the judge’s consideration of
whether the witness’s evidence could be properly tested if he were to be
anonymous (s. 5(2)(d)) and whether it would be reasonably practicable
to protect the witness’s identity by means other than an anonymity
order (s. 5(2)(f)). An explicit measure is found in s. 7 which provides
that a judge must give the jury such warning as the judge considers
appropriate to ensure that the fact that the order was made in relation to
the witness does not prejudice the defendant.101 Indeed, it has been
suggested that it may prejudice further the fair trial rights of the accused
by inferring to the jury that the defendant is a dangerous individual from
whom other witnesses need to be shielded.102 All in all, the provisions of
the Act are not hugely different from the considerations that were held
to be inadequate by the House of Lords in Davis.
(d) The decision in Mayers
The consolidated appeals of R v Mayers and Others103 were the Court of
Appeal’s first opportunity to examine the provisions of the Criminal
Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008. The Lord Chief Justice stated
expressly that the judge’s role involves a ‘delicate balance’ between the
defendant’s fair trial rights under Article 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights and those of the witness under Articles 2 (life), 3
(physical security) and 8 (private life).104 The nature of this balance was
not enunciated in the speeches of their Lordships in Davis which, as
Professor Ashworth has pointed out,105 raises a point of contrast be-
tween the reasoning of the House in that case and R v G,106 and which,
it is our contention, would have rendered the decision in Davis subject to
far harsher criticism had it not been reversed by the Act.
In the first case, Mayers, the defendant appealed against his conviction
for murder. By the end of the trial, it was clear that the only identifica-
tion witness was the one witness who had been subject to an anonymity
order. She had come to the attention of the prosecution very close to the
trial and had an association with another man who had at one time been
a suspect in the case. The Court of Appeal held that before an anonymity
order for a civilian witness be granted, the judge should ensure there
had been a full investigation into the character of the witness, his or her
credibility, motive for giving evidence, possible association with the
defendant (or defendants, or their families), of collusion with any other
anonymous witness(es), as well as consequent disclosure of relevant
100 See R v Mayers [2009] 1 Cr App R 30 at [19] and [23].
101 Note, however, that the Strasbourg Court’s view in Al Khawaja and Tahery v United
Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 1 that no warning to the jury could have served to
compensate for the loss of opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses (at
[28]). 
102 Howarth, above n. 98 at 7.
103 [2009] 1 Cr App R 30.
104 Ibid. at [6].
105 Case Comment to R v Davis [2008] Crim LR 915.
106 [2008] Crim LR 818.
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information. If a judge is dissatisfied with the investigation, disclosure or
‘good faith of the efforts made . . . into any relevant consideration
bearing on the question of witness anonymity’ an application should be
met with a ‘point blank refusal’.107 The Court of Appeal approved the
decision in respect of public interest immunity in R v H and C,108 and
encouraged a parallel adoption of Special Counsel into anonymity cases
despite the fact that the Act is silent on the matter.109
Aside from whether the anonymity order was necessary under Con-
ditions A and C, which the Court of Appeal did expressly consider,
Mayers’s appeal was allowed because his trial was not fair. The decisive
nature of the witness’s evidence and the ‘absence of full and compre-
hensive inquiries’ into her credibility, motivation and integrity rendered
the conviction unsafe. 110
Conversely, in the second appeal, Glasgow, there had been full in-
vestigations into the character and associations of the witnesses, all of
which had been disclosed to the defence. Overlaying the three funda-
mental safeguards mentioned above to these facts leads to the conclu-
sion that anonymity was necessary because the witnesses would not
have testified had their identities been revealed (Condition C) and they
were in fear for their safety (Condition A), the evidence was not sole or
decisive111 and the existence of sufficient countermeasures ensured a
fair trial. The issue at trial was the accuracy of the identification evidence
on which the witnesses could be cross-examined. Witnesses were pro-
vided in the witness box with a list of the true names and pseudonyms
of the other witnesses so they could comment on whether the other
witness was present at the scene, and if so, where they were located. On
the other hand, the defendant had not replied to police questions, had
not made a defence statement and did not give evidence. The Court of
Appeal emphasised the importance of defence disclosure as crucial,
although that was not to understate the duty of the prosecution to be
proactive.112 Further, the trial judge had addressed the possibility of
relocating some or all of the witnesses, which he had rejected as in-
effective, disruptive and/or disproportionate. On appeal, the court
briefly discussed the availability of witness relocation orders in general,
and concluded that they are rarely practicable alternatives to anonymity
and would, if forced on a witness, engage his Article 8 rights.113
The third appeal, Costelloe and Bahmanzadeh, raised questions specific
to the role of undercover police officers, where Condition A in respect of
107 [2009] 1 Cr App R 30 at [10].
108 [2004] 2 AC 134.
109 Attorney-General guidelines on the prosecutor’s role in applications for witness
anonymity are available on the Attorney-General’s website: http:/
/www.attorneygeneral.gov.uk/sub_publications_guidelines.htm, accessed 13 October
2009. Part 4 deals with Special Counsel and restates the principles from H and C.
110 [2009] 1 Cr App R 30 at [52].
111 Ibid. at [75].
112 Notwithstanding any diligence or good faith of the part of the investigating
prosecutor, Lord Bingham in Davis was clear that ‘. . . the fairness of a trial should
not depend on the diligent performance of their duties by prosecuting authorities’:
[2008] 1 AC 1128 at [31].
113 [2009] 1 Cr App R 30 at [9].
Anonymous Witnesses in England and Wales: Charting a Course from Strasbourg?
525
the public interest might be more easily met than for civilian witnesses
(s. 4(3)(b)) and Condition C would be met because ‘senior police officers
would be likely to order [the officers] not to give evidence if their true
identities were known’.114 The appellants had been convicted of offences
in connection with the use of premises for the supply of Class A drugs
after anonymity orders had been made in respect of undercover police
officers, but defence counsel had nevertheless been able properly and
fully to test the officers' evidence. The Court of Appeal held that ‘there
are often sound operational reasons’ for maintaining the anonymity of
undercover operatives and ‘the court would normally be entitled to
follow the unequivocal assertion by an undercover police officer that
without an anonymity order he would not be prepared to testify’.115 It is
the contention here that such an approach may be acceptable in order to
meet Conditions A and C where covert operations are involved, but if
the defence is (in common parlance) entrapment and where the sole
and/or decisive evidence against the defendant is that of an anonymous
agent provocateur, a fair trial would be impossible.116
In the more recent decision of R v Powar,117 it was necessary for the
witnesses to be granted anonymity where they genuinely and reason-
ably feared retaliation and they would not have given evidence if their
identity had been known. Each witness was a neighbour of the accused
and must have lived in one of 20 or so houses which overlooked the
scene of the crime. The brutality of the murder, which had taken place
in public, was also a relevant factor. The evidence was neither sole nor
decisive, but nor was it consistent across all witnesses; something the
defence had the opportunity to test, but this went to reliability rather
than credibility. The accused had not reacted to the judge’s invitation to
identify by way of defence statement any trouble which any of them had
with any of their neighbours. The defence submission on appeal that
witness anonymity orders should be confined to cases of terrorism or
‘gangland’ killings was rejected. Of particular interest was the acknowl-
edgment by the trial judge that witness anonymity orders were ‘no
longer rare’,118 which would suggest that contemporary practice regu-
larly falls well short of the Strasbourg threshold that anonymity should
be a measure of last resort reserved for the most exceptional of
circumstances.
The Coroners and Justice Bill 2009
The Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 is subject to a
sunset clause and, unless extended, will expire on 31 December 2009.119
114 Above n. 113 at [30].
115 Ibid.
116 The fourth case in the consolidated appeals was a prosecution application in
respect of anonymous hearsay. Although of interest, there is not enough space to
include a full analysis here. See further R. Huxley-Binns, Case in detail [2009] 1
Archbold News 6.
117 [2009] 2 Cr App R 8.
118 Ibid. at [42].
119 See David Howarth’s description of practice in New Zealand, above n. 98.
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Part 3 of the Coroners and Justice Bill 2009, introduced to Parliament on
14 January 2009, will re-enact the central provisions of the 2008 Act,
subject to some ‘modifications’ (in the words of the Explanatory
Notes).
The provisions of the Bill broadly mirror the 2008 Act. As such, it
might be viewed as a missed opportunity to frame the law in line with
international standards and practices that are perceived to work relat-
ively effectively elsewhere. No provision is made for the use of Special
Counsel,120 and Professor Ormerod laments the failure of the govern-
ment to consider devising special rules governing the making of an-
onymity orders for undercover state agents as opposed to civilian
witnesses.121 Yet even before tinkering with the law, arguably policy-
makers should have afforded priority to bolstering the existing witness
protection arrangements in England and Wales. As the human rights
NGO Justice has suggested, the resort to witness anonymity is often a
poor substitute for putting in place proper witness protection meas-
ures.122 If fearful witnesses were offered a more comprehensive level of
protection at any early stage in the criminal investigation, then there is
a greater likelihood that anonymity would be viewed by the courts as an
exceptional measure and a last port of call where initial arrangements
were likely to be insufficient.123
More significantly however, there remains some disquiet as to
whether the provisions of the Bill are compatible with Convention
standards.124 Foremost among these concerns are the grounds on which
an anonymity order may be granted. Anonymity may not only be
granted to ensure the safety of witnesses and their associates, but
(pursuant to Condition A in cl. 84(3)) can also be ordered to ‘prevent
any serious damage to property’ or to ‘prevent real harm to the public
interest’. The former ground appears to be unduly broad; cases before
the European Court of Human Rights have invariably involved threats
to human life or to the physical integrity to the person. Casting the net
to capture incidences of criminal damage could potentially be used to
allow anonymous witnesses to be readily introduced for a form of
120 See also Howarth, above n. 98.
121 Case comment to R v Mayers [2009] Crim LR 272.
122 Justice, above n. 6 at para. 185.
123 Currently no centralised witness protection arrangements exist in England and
Wales, with local police forces administering their own schemes and making
decisions about which witnesses are eligible for protection. Part 2, Ch. 4 of the
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 lays down various requirements for
protecting witnesses and other persons who are involved in investigations or
proceedings where the risk to their safety is so serious and life threatening that a
change of identity and/or relocation is necessary. Clause 73 of the Coroners and
Justice Bill 2009 makes provision for ‘investigation anonymity orders’ in cases of
murder or manslaughter caused by a firearm or a knife. These prohibit the
disclosure of any information that (a) identifies the specified person as a person
who is or was able or willing to assist a qualifying criminal investigation specified
in the order, or (b) that might enable the specified person to be identified as such
a person. Clause numbers are correct as at 3 November 2009, but are subject to
change.
124 Notwithstanding the view of the Justice Secretary who, pursuant to s. 19 of the
Human Rights Act 1998, stated that in his view the measures in the Bill were
compatible with Convention rights.
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relatively low-level crime. As the Equality and Human Rights Commis-
sion has recognised, this provision would appear to fall a long way short
of the standard ordinarily required by the Strasbourg Court.125 In the
same way, the latter ground, alluding to the protection of the public
interest, carries its own dangers. The question as to what qualifies as the
‘public interest’ is fraught with difficulty, and there is a strong possibility
that it could be used to protect a variety of state interests as opposed to
merely protecting the identity of undercover officers.
One of the points of divergence between the anonymity arrange-
ments under the Bill and those under the 2008 Act is the absence of the
term ‘necessary’ as part of Condition C. Whilst s. 4(5)(a) of the 2008 Act
explicitly made clear that the order had to be ‘necessary’ in the interests
of justice because of the importance of the testimony and the fact that
the witness would not testify if the order were not made, cl. 84(5) now
provides that:
Condition C is that the importance of the witness’s testimony is such that in
the interests of justice the witness ought to testify and—
(a) the witness would not testify if the proposed order were not made,
or
(b) there would be real harm to the public interest if the witness were
to testify without the proposed order being made. (Emphasis
added)
Thus not only has word ‘necessary’ been dropped, but it is also far from
clear what the latter alternative requirement adds to the necessity
requirement under the unamended Condition A. In Mayers,126 Lord
Judge CJ directed that Condition C be addressed first. This was logical
because if the witness was prepared to give evidence without an
anonymity order, one would not have been necessary; and an un-
necessary anonymity order would clearly breach Article 6. Under the
Coroners and Justice Bill, however, necessity is not a requirement under
Condition C, and an anonymity order could be granted because other-
wise there would be ‘real harm to the public interest’. Condition A
should therefore be considered first—the order is necessary to protect
the witness’s (or another’s) safety, or prevent serious property damage
or real harm to the public interest. The importance of the testimony
(Condition C) should then be set off against the defendant’s fair trial
rights (Condition B and the unamended supplementary considerations
now in cl. 84).
Far from reconciling English law with the Convention standard, it
appears that the 2009 Bill dilutes the accused’s Article 6 rights still
further through broadening the grounds of which an anonymity order
may be granted. Moreover, it can be noted that neither the 2008 Act nor
the 2009 Bill encapsulate the core Convention requirement that convic-
tions must not be solely or decisively based on anonymous testimony.
125 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Parliamentary Briefing: Coroners and Justice
Bill House of Commons, Committee Stage (Equality and Human Rights Commission:
London, 2009).
126 [2009] 1 Cr App R 30.
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Whilst the ‘sole/decisive’ question is laid down as a ‘relevant considera-
tion’ for the court under cl. 85(2)(c), courts are not bound to refuse to
issue an order in these circumstances. As such, the scheme clearly
envisages the possibility of an accused being convicted solely or
decisively on the basis of anonymous witness testimony.
Conclusions
Witness anonymity is a thorny issue, and care should be taken not to
belittle those who suffer from, or fear, the very real problem of witness
intimidation. The value of anonymity orders to such persons should not
be underestimated and, likewise, they are an invaluable tool for enab-
ling prosecutions to proceed in cases where they might not have other-
wise done so. While searching for solutions to pressing new problems, it
is right that policymakers should take heed of newly emergent rights for
victims and witnesses, and be prepared to take innovative and even
unpopular steps to assist such persons. Labyrinthine interest-balancing
exercises are bound to arise from time to time, and the European Court
of Human Rights still faces a tortuous task to clarify how specifically the
rights of victims and witnesses under Articles 2, 3, and 8 of the Conven-
tion dovetail with the fair trial rights of the accused.127 Thus far, the
court has been relatively imprecise in the guidance it has provided on
the complexities inherent in such an exercise. However, in a climate of
‘popular punitiveness’,128 it is arguably all too easy for the government
to couch reforms in the language of victims’ rights, when more sinister
state interests or political motivations may well dictate the direction of
criminal justice reform.129 As such, we ought to be vigilant that rights
that are well established in both the domestic legal system and the
international platform are not lightly eroded.
There are certainly circumstances where anonymity can, and should,
be granted without compromising the rights of the defence. A fair trial
can still be ensured providing the court deems the order strictly neces-
sary for the protection of life/physical integrity of an individual, puts in
place sufficient countermeasures for the defence, and ensures that any
conviction is not based solely or decisively upon such evidence. That
would appear to be the (relatively clear) position of the European Court
of Human Rights, but it is apparent that English law imposes a much
lower threshold. It would seem that yet another nudge from Strasbourg
may be required if domestic law is to become fully compliant.
127 See further Gillespie and Bettison, above n. 4; Doak, above n. 12; F. Klug, ‘Human
Rights and Victims’ in E Cape (ed.), Reconcilable Rights? Analysing the Tension between
Victims and Defendants (Legal Action Group: London, 2004); F. Leverick, ‘What Has
the ECHR Done for Victims?’ (2004) 11 IRV 177.
128 A. Bottoms, ‘The Philosophy and Politics of Punishment and Sentencing’ in
C. Clarkson and R. Morgan (eds), The Politics of Sentencing Reform (Clarendon Press:
Oxford, 1995).
129 See further J. Jackson, ‘Justice for All: Putting Victims at the Heart of Criminal
Justice?’ (2003) 30 JLS 309.
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